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Katrina Information Assurance (IA) Lessons Learned

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Outline



- Defining IA Availability and Continuity of Operations (COOP)
- Katrina Background and Expectations
- Katrina Events/Situation Reports (SITREPs)
- Lessons Learned from NTCS Det New Orleans
- Summary
- Recommendations



What is IA Availability?



"Measures that Protect and Defend Information and Information Systems by Ensuring Their <u>Availability, Integrity, Authentication,</u> <u>Confidentiality, and Non-Repudiation</u>. This Includes Providing for Restoration of Information Systems by Incorporating <u>Protection,</u> <u>Detection, and Reaction</u> Capabilities"

Availability

 Timely, Reliable Access to Data and Information Services for Authorized Users



Continuity of Operations (COOP)



- All military bases have some form of terrestrial services or commercial communications
- COOP plans include
 - Specific procedures to implement before, during, and after an attack or natural disaster
 - Critical services required to support the mission
 - Personnel
 - Equipment
 - Facilities/locations
- Key personnel needed to execute COOP
 - Identify specific duties
 - Experienced/trained personnel
 - Prior disaster/recovery experience



Background




- Hurricane Katrina was a Category 4
 hurricane that hit the
 Louisiana/Mississippi Gulf Coast
- The initial impact of the hurricane was minimal, however when the levees in New Orleans broke, significant devastation occurred
- Many IA lessons learned from 9/11 were not applicable to Katrina



Before/After Katrina







Katrina Exceeded Planned Expectations



- Physical recovery exceeded 3 weeks
 - IT equipment needed for longer recovery was evacuated by helicopter post Katrina
 - COOP "move-to" facilities too small to accept full command – Had to move to multiple locations
- Recall plan was locally focused and compromised by the scope of Katrina
 - Cell & local phones were not working
 - Muster area was unreachable
 - Few blackberries distributed pre-event but additional ones distributed post Katrina
 - Key personnel were dispersed and distracted



Katrina Events/SITREPs (GIG Status)



- JTF-GNO status of the GIG was listed as "Green"
 - Not Navy/NMCI or local base, camp, station perspective
 - Physical location & hierarchical position are important and impact perception
- Isolated NIPR & SIPR outages in affected regions



• Timely, Reliable Access to Data and Information Services for Authorized Users



Katrina Events/SITREPs (Alternate Paths)



- Increased need for DoD & Non- DoD SATCOM when ground based infrastructure is not available
 - Satellite, handheld assets (Iridium, Blackberry), microwave networks
 - Numerous Satellite trucks/phones
 - Cellular on Wheels (COW) and Satellite Cellular on Light Truck (COLT)
- Transportable 911 call center deployed to assist in restoring 911 services
- Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) performed well



Katrina Events/SITREPs (Alternate Paths)



- Significant number of Satellite Access Requests (SARs) generated in response to Katrina
 - 6 months normal volume worth in short time period
 - Unfamiliar with the SAR paperwork & process
 - Validated without review or COCOM prioritization
- SAR submittal, prioritization, & inventory management processes were not followed or enforced
 - Policies/procedure to operate at degraded mode
 - Majority of user problems attributed to user errors
- Major cell provider placed mobile cell unit in LA to provide cell coverage for NAS New Orleans



Katrina Events/SITREPs (Content Staging & Access)




- Critical time-sensitive data required by non-DoD
 - Content Staging allows accumulation of multi-source data to happen
 - State/Local Governments and First Responders require access support recovery/relief efforts in affected regions
- Homeland Security cannot be carried out effectively on military networks to which non-DoD users don't have access
 - Need appropriate access control policy and mechanisms
- Aggregation of data may result in an increase in classification



Lesson Learned from NTCS New Orleans



- Never build an IT facility on a coastline
- Never build on the first floor in a flood-prone area
- Make certain electricians remain on base to baby-sit the generators
- Never include windows on a computer floor
- Establish a yearly
 Preventative Maintenance
 contract to test UPS batteries
 at least once a year for under load voltage and internal
 resistance





Lesson Learned from NTCS New Orleans



- Make certain that all critical personnel have cell phones
- Make certain that all critical personnel have a hardcopy of important contacts
- Make certain that all critical personnel take a hardcopy of important contacts with them when/if they have to evacuate
- Put major systems on support/maintenance contracts with the manufacturer, include emergency response service





Summary



- COOP Plans in-place and successfully executed
 - Real-life experience in previous natural disasters helped w/training and planning
 - Many IA lessons learned from Katrina not applicable to 9/11
- Certain applications were severely impacted after Katrina
 - Fail-over to alternate paths increases latency
 - Rerouted paths may provide connectivity, but may not provide sufficient Quality of Service for key applications
 - Policies/procedures to operate in degraded mode
- GIG can support Homeland Defense by providing critical data to non-DoD users
 - Develop policies and procedures to allow access to assemble and disseminate critical data



Recommendations



- Review COOP Plans to incorporate Katrina Lessons Learned
- Establish a portal front-end that supports the staging and discovery of unclassified information
- Ensure personnel are trained to handle increased SATCOM requirements during a crisis
 - Include higher echelon review and prioritization responsibilities
 - Identify an office responsible for interfacing with commercial SATCOM providers
- Develop specific policy to clarify roles, responsibilities and procedures when non-DoD users connect to the GIG